revolution in Soviet military affairs implies a genuine Soviet incentive to pursue arms control agreements with the United States. -..
The Tula PrIncIples
A ground-breaking change since the heyday of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, the Soviet shift away from nuclear contingencies and toward a conventional option has perhaps emerged most tangibly since L. I. Brezhnev's 1977 address at Tula. Here Brezhnev affirmed that the Soviet Union was not striving for military superiority with the aim of delivering a first strike. *First strike* was understood in the Western sense: a unilateral damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, achieved through some combination of offensive means and active and passive defensive means (ABII, counterforce against land and sea, civil defense).
Soviet military thought had now concluded that neither side could achieve a unilateral damage-limiting capability; defense of the population against the inevitable -.etaliatory strike was unattainable, both technologically and financially.
By denying the possibility of achieving a first-strike capability, defined as a unilateral damage-limiting capacity, Brezhnev had cut the line running from 1965 to 1976 on the possibility of developing a means of defense against nuclear weapons. In Marxist-Leninist terms, this possibility is determined by the dialectical law of unity and struggle of opposites, or the dialectic of arms development.
-2-This dialectic, the process wherein every means of attack generates a new means of defense (and vice versa), has proved crucial in shaping long-term Soviet force development programs. From 1965 to 1976, the proponents of nuclear force development held center stage precisely
because of the open-ended nature of the dialectic of arms development.
While they were prepared to concede that all-out nuclear war would result in unacceptable damage in present-day conditions, they deemed it indisputable that means and methods of active and passive defense against these weapons and their carriers would be perfected. Under these circumstances, the very idea of achieving military superiority.. .becomes absurd.... The ineluctable development of nuclear weapons has led to their beginning, in a certain sense, to negate themselves...." The essence of Tula--a downgrading of all nuclear options--is explicitly reflected in changing Soviet doctrine on "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD), nuclear war as an instrument of Soviet policy, the escalation potential of a future war, and the type of weaponry projected for that war.
Changing Soviet Doctrine
When Brezhnev rejected at Tula the possibility of a damagelimiting capacity In nuclear war, the Soviet politico-military leadership formed a consensus on the reality of MAD in present-day conditions. C. Gerasimov explicitly confirmed the Soviet acceptance of MAD in 1983: "then, as now, both sides in the nuclear confrontation possessed an assured capability to inflict an annihilating retaliatory strike on the aggressor (the Soviet formula), or to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on the attacking party as long as the situation for 'mutual assured destruction' exists (the American formula According to Soviet military thought, one of the "specific features" of a future war is its escalation potential. Since L. I.
Brezhnev's address at the 26th Party Congress in early 1981., Soviet 
Consequences of the No Revolution
The Lumediate consequences of changing Soviet doctrine on nuclear and conventional wars may include a new role for both nuclear and The new generation of Soviet SRIVF missiles can likewise be employed effectively with conventional warheads, which will give the Soviets "a formidable conventional deep-strike system."
ZmplIcatlons for Arms Control
The present study has provided evidence of a Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons in present-day The present levels of nuclear weapons now ensure "equal danger,* he noted at the 27th Congress. But a continuing race in nuclear arms will inevitably raise this danger to the point where even parity will cease to ensure deterrence. Gorbachev's sweeping arms control proposals thus converge at the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arsenals. He offers not only a stunning flexibility in the implementation of his agenda, but also a long-awaited accord on verification measures. Since his elevation to General Secretary, Gorbachev has repeatedly linked the success of his "re-stucturing" program with the release of economic resources inherent in aims control agreements. The Soviet Union needs peace, he asserted as early as 1984, in order to achieve its revolutionary socio-economic objectives. In April 1986, he acknowledged that the country has no financial resources to spare--primarily due to the allocations required for its defense needs. Owing to our economic concerns, he continued in September 1986, we would welcome any opportunity to divert economic resources from defense to the civilian sector. Western analysts note that a nuclear arms control agreement -19-would yield a "cost-avoldance" effect for the Soviets. By specifying the threat posed by U.S. nuclear forces over time, the acquisition of some costly Soviet program designed to counter a "worst case" scenario would prove unnecessary. A nuclear arms control treaty would also yield a "cost-reduction" effect by restricting planned Soviet deployments and spending.
A conventional arms control agreement would lessen, in turn, the imperative to rechannel funds from nuclear into conventional programs.
Western analysts agree that Gorbachev has built his impressive nuclear and conventional arms control edifice on a triad of -20-
